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Abstract 
 
What better accounts for Barack Obama's success with Congress, his political skills or 
aspects of the political context, such as party control of Congress and public approval? To address 
this question, we update the Bond-Fleisher-Wood (BFW) political context model through 2010. 
The BFW model accounts for Obama’s success vis-à-vis the House, to some extent, for the Senate 
as well. This article argues that increasing party polarization affects the relationship between party 
control and presidential success differently in the House and Senate.  In the supermajoritiarian 
Senate, greater partisanship diminishes the effects of party control—in other words, as party 
polarization increases, presidential success declines for both majority and minority presidents. A 
comparison of Obama’s success with that of previous presidents facing a similar context reveals no 
evidence that Obama has won significantly more often than should be expected given the context.   
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In his first two years in office, Barack Obama could boast of enactment of several landmark pieces 
of legislation, including economic stimulus, financial industry reform, health care reform, major tax 
legislation, and repeal of the “Don't Ask-Don't Tell” policy with regard to gays serving in the 
military. His success in sponsoring legislation also seems quite impressive. During his first years in 
office, his legislative proposals won 93and 86 percent of House votes and 98 and 75 percent of 
Senate votes. The average success rates for other presidents, who like him, benefited from majority 
control were 77.5 in the House and 73.9 in the Senate.  Given the gridlock, partisan bickering, and 
party polarization that characterize current American politics, these legislative success rates surely 
represent major achievements. 
Some scholars attribute Obama’s successes to his political skills. For instance, Fred 
Greenstein observes that Obama is “a gifted public communicator”, that his “prepresidential record 
shows ample evidence of his political skill”, that he is intelligent and open-minded, and that “the 
Barrack Obama of today may be the rare political leader who has a first-rate temperament and a 
first-rate mind.”1 Stanely Renshon describes Obama as having “supple intelligence, policy 
knowledge, and substantial rhetorical skills.”2 According to journalist Peter Slevin, Obama honed 
his political skills in the rough and tumble of Illinois politics, which prepared him for political life 
in Washington.3 
The idea that a president's skills affect his success with Congress has a long and venerable 
tradition in presidential studies. Richard Neustadt argued that skilled presidents use their skill or 
reputation for skill to overcome disadvantages in various bargaining situations. “[A]ny President 
who valued personal power would start his term with vivid demonstrations of his tenacity and skill 
in every sphere . . . . 4 Due to their individual skill sets, a president may be “uncommonly 
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successful” according to Roger Davidson.5 Several comparative studies argue that skills account for 
success.6 Numerous presidential biographies and case studies of legislative episodes also stress the 
importance of personal skills in leadership success.7 
Another tradition, however, argues that the political context determines presidential success: 
Presidents can expect a high degree of success when the context is favorable, such as when the 
president’s party controls Congress and when public approval is high. Success will decline when 
the context is not so favorable.8 In their study of ten presidents who served from 1953-2001, 
Fleisher, Bond, and Wood detected no evidence that political skills helped explain congressional 
success beyond context. They found that some presidents’ success varied unpredictably from 
Congress to Congress, and during the same Congress, some presidents were more successful in one 
chamber than in the other. Even presidents commonly cited for their political skills, like LBJ or 
Reagan, did not enjoy greater success once context is considered in their analysis; and others like 
Nixon and Carter, who allegedly lacked political skill, were not less successful than their peers 
once context is taken into account.9 
Thus we have two types of explanations for presidential success with Congress—political 
skill and political context. Which type better explains Obama's success with Congress? To address 
this question, we update the Bond, Fleisher, Wood (BFW) political-context model through 2010. 
The model accounts for Obama’s success in the House quite well; it does less well predicting 
success in the Senate. The declining predictive power of the BFW model for the Senate, however, 
does not appear to be due to Obama’s political skills. We shall argue that party polarization 
combined with the increasing use of supermajoritarian in the Senate decision rules better accounts 
for weaker statistical fit of the model.  
Political Context and Presidential Success in Congress 
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Past research has identified several variables that influence members’ of Congress roll-call behavior. 
The BFW model focuses on party control, presidential honeymoons, presidential approval, and party 
polarization. 
Party Control and Presidential Success 
According to George Edwards and Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher, the foremost factor affecting 
presidential success with Congress is party control.10 Presidential support is higher among members of 
the president’s party than among the opposition. As a result, the president’s position is more likely to 
win more votes when his party controls Congress than when the opposition party is in power. 
Past research has identified multiple reasons for the strong influence of party on congressional 
behavior. First, because members of the same political party must satisfy similar electoral coalitions, 
they share a wide range of policy preferences. Co-partisans and their constituents are therefore more 
likely to agree with the president's policy preferences than are opposition party members. Second, 
members of the president’s party must run on his record as well as their own, which provides them with 
an incentive to help him succeed.  In addition, the majority party controls important levers of power in 
Congress, including committees, access to the floor, and rules governing debate and roll call voting. So, 
the issues on the congressional agenda and presentation of choices to members are more likely to 
reflect the president’s preferences when his party controls the chamber.11 
The Presidential Honeymoon 
New presidents also tend to enjoy higher success early in their first terms. During the so-called 
honeymoon, the public, the Washington press corps, and members of Congress are predisposed to give 
a newcomer the benefit of the doubt. As a result, this period is widely viewed as the most propitious 
time for presidential initiatives.12 Paradoxically, the first year is also a period of learning and 
adjustment for the president, so there is no guarantee that he will be able to exploit the potential benefits 
of the honeymoon.13 
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Popular Support  
Public approval provides a third source of presidential success in Congress. According to Neustadt, the 
president’s popularity affects calculations of electoral self-interest among members of Congress 
because they fear electoral retribution if they either oppose a popular president or support an unpopular 
one.  In Neustadt’s words: members of Congress “must take account of popular reactions to their 
actions. What their publics think of them becomes a factor, therefore, in deciding how to deal with the 
desires of a President. His prestige enters into that decision; their publics are part of his.”14 
Public approval, however, should have only a marginal effect on presidential success because 
of other, often more powerful, forces influencing members’ roll-call votes, such as constituency and 
party.15 For instance, members of Congress may vote against a popular president who takes a position 
on an issue that their constituents oppose.16 
Party Polarization 
Party polarization in Congress is the final major political context factor that affects presidential success. 
Polarization, however, has an indirect effect on success.  According to Bond, Fleisher and Wood, 
during periods of low party polarization an increasing number of members of Congress experience 
conflicts among their cues, such as party and ideology, when they decide how to cast their votes. When 
many members experience such conflict, the level of public approval for the president becomes more 
influential in their decisions. During periods of high partisanship, there are fewer cross-pressured 
members, and the effect of public approval declines.17 
Party polarization also conditions the relationship between party control and presidential 
success. Presidents typically champion the preferences of their party’s mainstream.18 When parties are 
polarized, presidential cues reinforce the primary cues of members from his party, which results in 
fewer defections and which leads to higher success if his party controls the chamber.  
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are 
The effects, however, are likely to differ in the House and Senate. Two features of the Senate 
tend to insulate Senators from popular influences and to mute the effects of both public opinion and 
party. First, Senators serve six-year terms, and only one-third face the voters in any given election. The 
president’s popularity is not likely to affect the reelection chances of the two-thirds of Senators whose 
next election is more than two years away. Second, Senate rules, such as the filibuster, allow 
individuals and the minority party to block legislation they oppose, whereas House rules allow even a 
slim partisan majority to win if it is cohesive. If parties are cohesive, the president will get greater 
support from his co-partisans, but less support from the opposition. Polarized parties in the House, 
therefore, should increase the success of majority presidents and decrease the success of minority 
presidents. Majority control is less of an advantage in the Senate governed by supermajoritarian 
decision rules, and polarized parties may reduce the advantage of majority control even more because a 
cohesive minority party is better able to block cloture. 
Variables 
We will measure the dependent variable, presidential success on the floor of the House and Senate, in 
terms of the annual percentage of conflictual roll calls from 1953 through 2010, the last year for which 
we have complete data .19 We will define a conflictual presidential roll call as one on which 20 percent 
or more of members vote against the president.20 We will exclude consensual presidential victories—
by which we mean—to limit the analysis to relatively important issues. A casual check of issues passed 
by near unanimous margins with the president’s support reveals that, with rare exceptions, these are 
minor and routine issues. Votes that the president lost with more than 80 percent voting against him
will remain in the analysis. These unusual cases reflect acute inter-institutional conflict. Such cases 
neither trivial nor routine, and belong in the analysis.  
The most important independent variable is party control of the House and Senate, which will 
be measured by a dummy variable21, coded 1 when the president’s party controls the chamber and 0 
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otherwise.22 We expect that other independent variables will have marginal effects on success. We will 
measure the honeymoon with a dummy variable, coded 1 for the first year after the president’s first 
election and 0 otherwise. We will code Lyndon Johnson with an early honeymoon in 1964, but Gerald 
Ford without a honeymoon. Second term presidents will not receive a second honeymoon.23 We will 
use the average annual percentage approving of the president’s job performance according to the 
Gallup job approval question—”Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the incumbent] is doing his 
job as president?” 
The percentage of party votes in each chamber per year will indicate party polarization in 
Congress.24  The annual percentage of all recorded votes in which a majority of Democrats opposed a 
majority of Republicans will define party vote. We modify the usual practice and exclude consensual 
roll calls (that is, roll calls with 10 percent or fewer members voting in the minority). This revised 
measure will indicate the percentage of all conflict on roll call votes that is party conflict.25 According 
to the BFW model, party polarization should not affect presidential success directly, but will condition 
the effects of public approval and party control on success. To measure this conditional effect, we will 
create interaction terms by multiplying approval or party control by the percentage of party votes in 
each chamber.26 We will analyze the House and Senate separately, and will expect the effects of 
approval, party control, and the interactions to be weaker in the Senate than in the House. 
Results of the Updated Models 
Our analysis brings the BFW model up to date in two stages.  We first extend the model from 1953 
through 2008, prior to Obama's taking office. We then extend it through 2010, the last year for which 
we have complete data. Table 1 presents results of multivariate OLS estimations.27  
 The BFW model continues to fit voting patterns within the House.  The model’s predictions 
diverge somewhat from voting behavior in the Senate. The updated House models produce R2s of .83 
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and .84, up from about .77 in Fleisher, Bond, and Wood, while the updated Senate models produced 
R2s of .57 and .56 compared to.70 in the earlier analysis.28  
[Table 1 about here] 
Turning to the impact of specific variables, the House estimates indicate that party control, 
interacting with party polarization, accounts for almost all of the explained variance in presidential 
success as it did in the original BFW model. Contrary to the original analysis, however, public 
approval and the honeymoon have no significant effect in the House. Approval and the honeymoon 
are correlated, which may obscure their separate effects on success. Presidents typically have 
higher approval in their first year in office. In these data, approval and the honeymoon are 
correlated at r = 0.35, p <.01), with presidential approval averaging 63.7 in honeymoon years and 
53.3 for non-honeymoon years. Approval fails to attain statistical significance even if we drop the 
honeymoon from the equation. But, the honeymoon becomes significant when we drop approval 
and the interaction between approval and party voting for the 1953-2010 estimation. Under these 
conditions, the honeymoon almost reaches conventional statistical significance for the years 1953-
2008. 
Turning to the Senate, we see honeymoon effects but no significant effect for approval. 
Party control has significant effect for 1953-2008, but not in the model based on the full time series. 
Contrary to the BFW analysis of data through 2001, none of the interactions approaches 
conventional significance levels. The inclusion of so many correlated variables raises the specter of 
multicollinearity, which perhaps obscures the influence of party control and other variables.  
Table 2 presents reduced-form equations, which include only statistically significant 
independent variables.29 The political-context model continues to predict presidential success quite 
well for the House with R2s above .80. Public approval no longer seems to play a significant role, 
perhaps because party control has become more important as party polarization in the House has 
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widened. At the average level of party votes (67.7 percent), majority presidents win almost 34 
percent more votes than minority presidents. The coefficient for party polarization is about -1.00, 
indicating that minority presidents win about one percent fewer House votes for every one percent 
increase in party votes. The coefficient for the interaction term is positive 1.63 and 1.71, indicating 
that majority presidents win about one-and-two-thirds percent more votes for every one percent 
increase in party votes.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The reduced Senate model indicates that presidents tend to win more often during their 
honeymoon year and if public approval increases. The model suggests that presidents win about 
eight to ten percent more often during their first year in office. The effect of public approval is more 
marginal—a relatively large 10-percent increase in approval30 is associated with about 2.5 percent 
more wins. Party control has a strong positive effect, with majority presidents winning about 20 
percent more votes. As expected, the benefits of majority control are less in the Senate than in the 
House (≈ 34 percent). The coefficient for party polarization is -.22 and significant, but the 
interaction is not significant. This result indicates that both majority and minority presidents win 
about 2.2 percent fewer votes with a 10 percent increase in party votes.  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these relationships with scatter plots of presidential success against 
the percentage of party votes. Although the relationship overall is nil in both chambers (House R2 = 
.01; Senate R2 = .03; slopes close to zero and not significant), the effect of party voting on success 
differs markedly for majority and minority presidents. In the House, the relationship is positive for 
majority presidents and negative for minority presidents—if the percentage of party votes increases 
10 percent, majority party presidents win about 6.5 percent more votes while minority presidents 
win about 10 percent less (p < .001, R2s ≈ .50). But notice that the success rates of majority and 
minority presidents differ only slightly when party voting falls below about 60 percent. In other 
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words, if parties are not cohesive, majority presidents tend to get less support from their party and 
minority presidents are better able to attract support from the opposition. 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
The relationships in the Senate are much weaker: R2 = .04 for majority presidents and .07 
for minority presidents (see Figure 2). The slopes are negative and of similar magnitude for both 
majority and minority presidents. Although the coefficients are not significant at conventional 
levels (p > .11 and .15 for majority and minority presidents respectively), they suggest that a 10-
percent increase in party votes decreases the success rate about 1.9 percent for majority presidents 
and about 2.9 percent for minority presidents. 
Changes in the political environment inside and outside of Congress help explain the 
changes in the performance of the model in the Senate. The 2000s was a decade of growing party 
polarization. The addition of these new cases alters the structure of the data as we now have more 
cases of high party polarization. Bond, Fleisher, and Wood have shown that factors influencing 
presidential success change as the political environment—especially party polarization—
fluctuates.31 During periods of high polarization, party becomes a stronger voting cue for members 
of Congress. However, greater partisanship has different effects in the House and Senate. In the 
House, as the parties become more cohesive and polarized, party control balloons in importance—
majority party presidents win more often and minority presidents lose more often. The Senate is a 
more complex story. Although party remains a significant influence on roll call voting in that 
chamber, Senate rules allow a minority to stall and even block issues from coming to the floor. This 
reduces the effect of party control on presidential success. Compared to their experiences in the 
House, majority-party presidents in the Senate receive a smaller boost of support, and minority 
party presidents lose less often. The right of unlimited debate (filibuster) and Senate rule XXII, 
requiring a supermajority to invoke cloture, are keys to minority power. Individual senators on both 
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the right and the left have long used the filibuster to block passage of legislation they strongly 
opposed. Historically, filibustering was not related to party control of the chamber.32 Indeed, the 
majority party undertook many of the best-known filibusters. Increasing party polarization in 
Congress transformed the filibuster into a partisan tool. The minority party now routinely uses it to 
influence policymaking and to block the confirmation of presidential nominees.33 Consequently, 
unlike the House, high levels of party polarization in the Senate tend to lower the success rate of 
both majority and minority presidents. 
Thus, differences in the way that party polarization conditions the relationship between 
party control and presidential success in the House and Senate explain the changes in the predictive 
power of the BFW model. The increasing party polarization after 2001 reinforced the strong 
relationship in the House and diminished the weaker relationship in the Senate.  But can the 
political-context model account for Obama's success with Congress? We will use the results in 
Table 2 to see how well the revised and updated BFW model does in predicting Obama's success 
with Congress. 
Predicting Obama's Success with Congress 
  Figures 3 and 4 present plots of the actual and predicted success rates for the House and Senate. 
For most years, the plots for both the House and the Senate are quite similar with only small gaps 
between the actual and predicted scores. Nevertheless, for several years substantial gaps appear 
between actual and predicted success. Moreover, they appear at different times for each chamber. In 
the House (Figure 3), the large gaps appear mainly during the 1960s and 1970s, with only two in 
recent years (2004 and 2008). In the Senate (Figure 4), the gaps occur primarily in recent years.  
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
To evaluate Greenstein’s argument that Obama's skills enabled him to be uncommonly 
successful we will analyze the gaps between predictions and performance in two ways.34 First, we 
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use the parameter estimates from the 1953-2008 estimations to forecast Obama's success with 
Congress in 2009 and 2010. Second, we will generate estimates for the entire time series and 
examine the predicted values for 2009 and 2010. The closer the statistical predictions come to 
Obama's actual success, the greater our confidence that political conditions account for his success, 
rather than his political skills. 
 As Table 3 shows, the political-context model, using the full data series, predicts Obama’s 
success with nearly pinpoint accuracy in the House. It misses his rate of success by only 1.2 and -
2.0 points respectively for 2009 and 2010. The House model for 1953-2008 also performs well, 
albeit not as accurately as for the 1953-2010 series, which is to be expected given that the longer 
series has more information. This model underpredicts Obama's success in House by 4.7 points in 
2009 and overpredicts his success by 6.3 points in 2010.  
The predictions, however, are not nearly as accurate for the Senate. Irrespective of 
estimation technique, the predictions for 2009 are wide of the mark by more than 20 percent. The 
2010 estimates are somewhat better, but still miss by 11-16 percent. 
[Table 3 about here] 
If Greenstein’s assessment is correct, we should find that Obama’s success rates were 
significantly higher than would be expected by random chance. We will test statistical significance with 
a type of standardized residuals used in earlier analysis.35 Using a 95 percent confidence interval, 
absolute values greater than about 2.02 are considered unusual. We would expect one in twenty to 
appear unusual by random chance—about 2.9 unusual observations in each chamber for a sample of 
size 58. 
Figure 5 plots these residuals for the House and Senate. For the House we have only three 
studentized residuals greater than ± 2.0 (1960, 1971, 1976); for the Senate we also have three such 
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residuals (1999, 2002, 2004), and 2009 (1.94) is close enough to count as a fourth. We would expect 
approximately this number of “unusual” residuals by chance.36  
[Figure 5 about here] 
We could not find any systematic pattern in these residuals consistent with expectations about 
which presidents were especially skilled or unskilled. We do not observe significant residuals in both 
chambers in the same year, nor do they cluster for any particular president. Although we do find two 
significant residuals for George W. Bush in the Senate, these unusual residuals point in opposite 
directions, with Bush winning significantly more than predicted in 2002 and significantly less in 2004. 
For presidents included in the Fleisher, Bond, and Wood study, we find a similar pattern.37 Two of the 
significant positive House residuals are for Eisenhower in 1960 (who is not often reputed to be 
unusually skilled38) and Nixon in 1971 (who is consistently rated as unskilled in dealing with 
Congress). And neither of the presidents who are reputed as highly skilled—Johnson and Reagan—
show up as unusually successful in any year.  Indeed, both had years in which they underperformed, 
and years when each did better in one chamber but worse in the other.  
Looking at Obama's success, we do not observe support for the claim that he was unusually 
successful.  His success in the House was very close to what should be expected given the context.  He 
did win more than expected in the Senate in both years, and the residual in 2009 is near the cutoff to 
consider a residual unusual. In our view, this pattern does not imply that Obama was unusually 
successful with the Senate. First, why would Obama be more successful than expected in the Senate 
than in the House? We know of no theory suggesting that presidential skills would be more effective 
for one chamber than the other. Second, from Paul Light's “cycle of increasing effectiveness” 
perspective, the pattern of under-prediction in the Senate from 2009 to 2010 is puzzling.39  Light 
suggests that presidents become more effective over time because they learn while on the job. Hence, if 
presidential skills influence relations with Congress, the impact should be more obvious  the longer the 
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president is in office. Here we see just the opposite: the gap between Obama’s actual and predicted 
success was much larger in 2009 than 2010. 
Another approach to assessing whether Obama is uncommonly successful is to look at the 
performance of other presidents who dealt with polarized parties in Congress, such as Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush. Party voting during the Clinton and Bush years averaged 76 and 78 percent in 
the House and Senate respectively. This is somewhat lower than the 88 and 90 percent during 
Obama's first two years in office. Still, party voting for Clinton and Bush was higher than the 
averages of 63 and 56 percent for previous presidents. When we focus on Clinton and Bush’s first 
two years, (See Figure 5), we find that in both cases, the House model predicts nearly as well as it 
did for Obama, with success slightly less than expected in one year and slightly more in the other.  
The predictions for the Senate also resemble those for Obama. Clinton and Bush did better than 
expected in both years, but with the second year higher (significantly better for Bush), which is 
consistent with “cycle of increasing effectiveness” concept.  Based on this evidence, it is hard to 
argue persuasively that Obama’s political skills—extraordinary as they may be—generated a 
greater amount of success given the political context.  
Obama, the 112th Congress and Beyond 
What does the model suggest about Obama’s success in subsequent years? We know the 
value of the most important variable for 2011-12—party control—and we can make educated 
guesses about the other variables—party polarization and public approval. The 2010 elections gave 
Republicans solid control of the House, but Democrats held on to the Senate. The success of 
extremely conservative Tea Party candidates makes it unlikely that party voting will decline in the 
112th Congress. Party voting at 90 percent is approaching the ceiling in both chambers. So, let’s 
assume party votes will remain at 90 percent in both chambers in 2011 and 2012.  Public approval 
is significant in the Senate model. We can assume a job approval rating in the mid-40s, the average 
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for most of 2011. Predictions based on these assumptions will provide another test of the BFW 
political context model of presidential success, though we must wait until all the data have been 
generated to determine how well the model holds up.   
The switch from majority to minority control with high party polarization has stunning 
implications for Obama's success in the House. The model predicts that his success on House roll 
calls should drop from 85.7 percent in 2010 to 17.4 percent in 2011 and 2012. Said differently, 
instead of winning on approximately 5/6th of roll calls with Democrats in control of the House, 
Obama can expect to lose on approximately 5/6th of roll calls with Republicans in the majority. 
Such a reversal of fortune is comparable to George W. Bush’s record. He averaged 78.2 percent 
success during his first six years in office, when his party controlled the House, and only 22.5 
percent when party control switched to the Democrats in 2007-8. Although this drop of nearly 56 
points is less than the predicted 68 percent decline for Obama, we would expect a greater drop off 
for Obama, not because he is less skilled than Bush, but because party polarization is higher. 
 Predictions for the Senate remain essentially the same for 2011 and 2012 as for 2010, at 
around 63 percent. This assumes that his job-approval rating hovers in the mid-40s. But even a 10- 
percent increase in approval to 55 percent would have only a modest impact on his success, about 2 
percent higher than if his approval is 45 percent. We are less confident in these point estimates for 
the Senate than for the House, due to the weaker statistical power of the Senate estimations. 
Furthermore, the model assumes that the size of the majority does not significantly add to the 
benefit of majority control. But going from nearly 60 votes in 2009-10 to 53 (counting the two 
Independents) may have some affect.  
Conclusions 
This paper has assessed two explanations of Barack Obama’s congressional success. One focuses 
on his personal skills and the other on the political context.  We find that the political-context 
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model does a good job of capturing the forces that affect presidential success.  Indeed, the 
predictive power of the political-context model for the House has actually improved from an earlier 
analysis (Fleisher, Bond, and Wood 2008).40 This enhanced predictive power is due the effects of 
increasing party polarization from 2001 to 2010. Because House rules enable a cohesive majority to 
prevail, increasing party polarization magnifies the effects of party control—majority presidents 
win more, minority presidents win less. An application of an updated version of the model to 
forecast Obama’s success rate in the 111th House of Representatives indicates that Obama’s 
relationship with the House was very much in line with what we would expect given the 
performance of his predecessors under similar conditions.  Additional data from Obama’s first two 
years in office do little to change our understanding of presidential success in the House, and do not 
provide evidence to conclude that Obama’s individual talents affected the pattern of success. 
Turning to the Senate, we find that the model’s predictive power is less strong but good in 
general. The decline in predictive power, however, does not lead us to conclude that presidential 
skills account for the weaker results.  Although the model predicts success in the Senate less 
accurately than in the House, we do not find more large errors than would be expected by random 
chance. Moreover, the pattern of errors is not consistent with the skills hypothesis.  Rather, we 
present evidence suggesting that party polarization is at least partially responsible. Whereas greater 
partisanship amplifies the effect of party control in the majoritarian House, it diminishes the effect 
of party control in the supermajoritarian Senate.  In the Senate, as party polarization increases, 
success rates decline for both majority and minority presidents. Although the filibuster once was a 
tool that small minorities of individual Senators used to protect their interests, party polarization 
has transformed it into a partisan tool that the minority party uses to block policies and nominees 
contrary to party interest. As these supermajoritarian procedures became partisan tools, the 
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frequency of their use has increased dramatically. As a result, the president’s allies in the Senate 
increasingly need to muster 60 votes to pass major policies and get nominees confirmed.  
Looking ahead to the 112th Congress, our results suggest that Obama’s success in the House 
will fall precipitously under Republican control.  Since party polarization is higher under Obama 
than Bush and Clinton, the model predicts that his success rate will drop even more than was the 
case for earlier minority presidents.  In the Senate with Democrats nominally controlling the 
chamber, Obama should be more successful than in the House. Nevertheless, with the increase in 
party polarization, we suspect that Obama may have lower levels of success than would be 
expected for a majority-party president dealing with less polarized parties.   
With respect to the debate between skills and context as foundations for presidential success 
in Congress, our analysis detected no evidence that skills matter systematically, and our findings 
lend additional support for the context explanation. In our opinion, political context—party control 
in Congress, the degree of party polarization, and to a lesser extent honeymoon and public 
approval—determines the broad parameters of presidential success on floor votes in Congress.  
Yet, the political-context model leaves much variance unexplained, and we should not 
necessarily dismiss political skills as irrelevant. “Skill” is an elusive concept, and no statement in 
the literature provides a sufficiently precise definition that would allow us to measure presidents’ 
skillfulness and test whether it matters for success in Congress. Absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence. As we move forward, scholarly energies should be devoted to the theoretical 
development of skill as a concept relevant to the legislative arena, with an eye on measurement and 
hypothesis testing. Admittedly, this task will be a difficult, but it is a necessary if we are to make 
progress toward a scientific understanding of presidential success in Congress. Until then, we stick 
by the conclusion that extraordinary political skills are rarely extraordinary enough to overcome the 
limits set by context. 
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Table 1: The Determinants of Presidential Success in the House and Senate, 1953-2008 and 
1953-2010* 
House Senate 
 Variables 
1953-2008 1953-2010 1953-2008 1953-2010 
-76.18 -76.85 26.14 15.33 Party Control 
(-3.96) (-4.63) (1.65) (0.96) 
3.82 4.35 7.87 9.93 Honeymoon 
(1.03) (1.23) (1.70) (2.17) 
1.09 1.03 0.91 0.91 
Public Approval 
(1.63) (1.58) (1.32) (1.31) 
-0.33 -0.37 0.33 0.34 
Party Polarization 
(-0.68) (-0.79) (0.52) (0.58) 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Approval x Party Polarization 
(-1.47) (-1.42) (-1.00) (-1.00) 
1.63 1.64 -0.11 0.08 Party Control x Party Polarization 
(5.77) (6.82) (-0.42) (0.33) 
56.67 59.53 17.99 17.58 Constant 
(1.29) (1.82) (0.45) (0.44) 
N 56 58 56 58 
R2 0.83 0.84 0.57 0.56 
* See text for variable definitions, t-values in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Revised Estimates of the Determinants of Presidential Success in the House and Senate, 
1953-2008 and 1953-2010* 
House Senate 
 Variables 
1953-2008 1953-2010 1953-2008 1953-2010 
-81.11 -76.65 19.65 20.78 Party Control 
(-4.16) (-4.57) (6.21) (6.46) 
-- 5.76 8.10 10.23 Honeymoon 
 (1.70) (1.78) (2.26) 
-- -- 0.24 0.21 Public Approval 
  (1.74) (1.55) 
-1.05 -1.02 -0.33 -0.22 Party Polarization 
(-7.45) (-7.47) (-2.60) (-1.83) 
-- -- -- -- Approval x Party Polarization 
    
1.71 1.63 -- -- Party Control x Party Polarization 
(5.99) (6.70)   
112.19 110.07 58.47 52.50 Constant 
(11.93) (11.97) (5.10) (4.56) 
N 56 58 56 58 
R2 0.81 0.83 0.55 0.55 
* See text for variable definitions, t-values in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Predicting Obama's Success in 2009 and 2010 
 House Senate 
 2009 2010 2009 2010
Actual Success 93.2 85.7 97.6 75.0
Predictions 
1953-2008 Model 88.5 92.0 71.4 63.3
1953-2010 Model 92.0 87.7 77.0 58.9
Residuals 
1953-2008 Model 4.7 -6.3 26.2 11.7
1953-2010 Model 1.2 -2.0 20.6 16.1
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Figure 1: How Party Polarization Affects the Relationship between Party Control and Presidential Success in the House  
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Figure 2: How Party Polarization Affects the Relationship between Party Control and Presidential Success in the Senate 
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Figure 3: Actual and Predicted Presidential Success in the House, 1953-2010 
Based on results from Table 2 
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Figure 4: Actual and Predicted Presidential Success in the Senate, 1953-2010 
Based on the results from Table 2  
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Figure 5: Which Presidents Were More or Less Successful than Expected in the House and Senate, 1953-2010?  
Based on results from Table 2 
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